

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza transmission risks: analysis of biosecurity measures and contact structures in Dutch poultry farming

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Introduction

In the 2003 Dutch epidemic of HPAI A virus subtype H7N7,


- 255 flocks (mainly layers) were affected, 30 million birds culled and 89 people infected with 1 fatality
- direct control costs amounted to 250 million Euros (indirect costs much higher)
- virus continued to spread even after implementing the EU recommended control strategies and between 80% to 90% of the cases occurred through untraced routes

Study aim: To identify possible mechanisms underlying the between-farm spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus among poultry farms in The Netherlands.

- analysis is exploratory; aiming to identify all "risky" events throughout the production round.
- Farm selection was intended to cover all the different husbandry systems used in the Dutch poultry industry.

Materials and Methods

- Development of a mathematical model to study the possibility of windborne spread
- Interview study to collect information about (potential) contact risks between farms and biosecurity measures
 - First round: 22 layer, 14 broiler, 4 turkey and 2 duck farmers
 - Second round: various poultry-related firms and professionals



Various scenarios are envisaged, for example:

- multi-stage process e.g., wind blows contaminated dust between locations and thereafter transported by other fomites into the farm,
- a farm visitor (humans, vehicles, rodents and insects) gets into contact with infectious material and visits another (susceptible) farm.

Key results

- Biosecurity issues:
 - most farms have showers that are never used
 - violation of biosecurity protocols during restocking
 - personal belongings are brought into poultry houses
 - hardly any farm has designated clean/dirty routes
 - no biosecurity protocols for the truck drivers
 - no wheel disinfection systems for some of the delivery trucks
 - shared equipment was not always cleaned
 - hardly any farm has protection against contamination by manure
- Contact risks through:
 - hired labour and regular farmer-meetings on farms
 - farmers and helpers accessing poultry on other premises
 - some farmers attracting visitors by selling farm products
- Water waste was most often disposed on the farm grassland producing contamination risks to e.g. surface water
- Flock thinning and spiking causes frequent visits by catching teams as well as some animal movements between farms

Table 1. Summary of key results on contact structures and biosecurity

	Layers (n=13)	Broilers (n=9)
General information		
#farms with >1 locations	5	0
#birds on the farm: mean (min-max)	39439(3350-130000)	52791(180-160000)
#farms with multiple-age system	4	0
#farms with manure being used in neighbourhood (on farm)	2(3)	2(2)
#farms using community (well) water	7(6)	6(3)
#farms where manure container and/or truck not always cleaned	2	3
#farms that re-use egg trays	11	na
#farmers dissatisfied with hygiene of trays and/or containers, pallets	7	na
#farms with >1 feed suppliers (>1 deliveries per week)	2(3)	1(5)
#farms using feed supplements (>1 suppliers)	9(4)	7(1)
#times (average) bedding are supplied per year	1.7	4.5
#farms that own all equipment used on farm	9	9

Table 2. Summary of "risky" visitor behaviours Freq of visits per cycle: Use biosecurity Enter poultry Deviate from mean(min-max) transit room houses protocol **Broilers** Layers Layers Broilers Layers Layers Broilers Broilers 8.7(2-23) Veterinarians 1.9(0-5)11/11 9/9 8/11 8/9 1/11 0/913.4(0-32) 3.1(0-10) 1/12 Feed mill technicians 11/12 7/8 10/12 6/8 0/8 6.3(0-20) Hatchery technicians 0.9(0-4)10/11 4/4 10/11 1/4 0/11 0/4 Repair technicians 1.5(0-5) 1.3(0-4)5/5 10/10 3/5 3/10 9/10 Inspectors 2.8(0-8)1.8(1-3) 10/13 6/9 4/13 1/9 2/13 13/13 Catchers 1.1(0-2)1.1(1-2)11/13 8/9 2/13 0/9 1.9(0-10) 0.1(0-1)1/1 5/5 0/5 0/1 Vermin Control

Conclusions

- Many between-farm contacts with "in-house" visits posing a greater risk.
- Practices like sharing of labour, equipment and delivery trucks, re-use of egg trays and unclean manure containers are risky
- Presence, in the farm neighbourhood, of agricultural fields using manure and water bodies accessed by wild birds may expose the farm.
- Veterinarians, Inspectors and other visitors seem to be complacent about biosecurity protocols.

Next steps

- Build models for transmissions risks based on the scenarios found
- Devise means on how to prioritize hygiene measures in relation to the risk of introduction and/or spread of HPAI.

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