


# Risk of introduction of African swine fever to Denmark through animal movements, trucks and imported meat

A. Boklund<sup>1</sup>, J. Dahl<sup>2</sup>, L.H.Nielsen<sup>2</sup>, S. Mortensen<sup>3</sup>, T. Halasa<sup>1</sup>

- 1 Section for Animal welfare and Disease Control, Department of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, University of Copenhagen
- 2 Department for Food Safety, Veterinary business and Risk Analyses, Danish Agriculture and Food Council
- 3 The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration, Head Office, Denmark



## Pathways included: • Import of animals


- Import of semen
- Returning livestock trucks
- Legally imported meat


The probability of introduction is highest from trucks returning after export of pigs - Despite the extra control measures implemented

- Due to the high numbers of returning trucks

#### Input data

- Danish statistics
- Legeally import of meat and meat products
- Traces
  - Imports of live pigs and semen
- Eurostat and OIE
- Numbers of herds in countries of origin
- Nigsch et al· 2013
- Numbers of infected herds within HRP in EU countries
- Mur et al., 2012
  - Risk of introduction to free EU countries
- DANISH
  - Probability of wash and disinfection at border
- Veterinary and Food Administration
  - Effect of wash and disinfection





Wash and disinfection of returning trucks combined with quarantine time are the most influential parameters regarding returning trucks



disinfected at the Danish border

#### Conslusion/Perspectives

Focus on returning trucks must be continued

are also influential

- Further research on contamination of vehicles and virus survival time in trucks is needed
- Other patways needs to be investigate
- Illegal imports, hunters and vets travelling to infected areas, farm employees from other countries - maybe in a qualitative analyses as data is limited



Pigs experimentally infected with ASF

### Materials and methods:

The risk of introduction via imported pigs or boar semen was calculated based on:

 $p_{intro,swine,c} = 1 - \prod_{c} (1 - p_{batch_c})^{\#batch_c*HRP/time}$ ,

whereas c is the country of origin,  $p_{batch_c}$  is the probability that a batch from county c is infected,  $\#batch_c$  is the number of batches imported from country c, HRP is the length of the high risk period as estimated based on Nigsch et al. 2013 and time is the time period in which data was extracted. Futhermore,  $p_{batch,c}$  is calculated as

 $p_{batch,c} = P_c * (1 - (1 - p_{an_c})^{batchSize_c}) * p\_surv * (1 - p\_detect) + P_c * (1 - (1 - p_{an_c})^{batchSize_c}) * (1 - p\_surv),$ 

whereas  $P_c$  is the probability that country c is infected,  $p_{an_c}$  is the probability of selecting an infected animal from a randomly chosen herd in country c,  $batchSize_c$  is the number of animals in a batch from country c,  $p\_surv$ is the probability that an exported batch of animals is clinically surveyed before export, and  $p_{detect}$  is the probability of detection of ASF at surveillance. Eah scenario was run in 200 iterations.

> **University of Copenhagen Department of Veterinary and Animal Sciences Section for Animal Welfare and Disease Control**

> > Grønnegårdsvej 8 1870 Frederiksberg C Denmark

Corresponding author:

**Anette Boklund** Senior advisor

Phone: +45 35 33 08 47 Email: anebo@sund.ku.dk

